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Abstract
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items
among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior
information on the agents’ preferences. The objective is to design strategyproof mechanisms which
are competitive against the most efficient (but not strategyproof) mechanism.
For the case with two items:
• We provide a set of sufficient conditions for strategyproofness.
• We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive
than all prior strategyproof mechanisms.
• We improve the linear-program-based proof of Guo and Conitzer [GC10] to show new upper
bounds on competitive ratios.
• We provide the first compact proof on upper bound of competitiveness.
For the cases with any number of items, we build on the Partial Allocation mechanisms
introduced by Cole et al. [CGG13a, CGG13b] to design a strategyproof mechanism which is
0.67776-competitive, breaking the 2
3
barrier.
We also propose a new sub-class of strategyproof mechanisms for any numbers of agents and
items, which we call it Dynamic-Increasing-Price mechanisms, where each agent purchases the
items using virtual money, and the prices of the items depend on other agents’ preferences.
1 Introduction
Competition for resources is one of the most primitive activities of human. The problems of dis-
tributing resources among competing agents are found wherever human exists. We have developed
various systems and tools, e.g., economic markets, auctions/mechanisms, voting systems and money,
to facilitate the distributions and exchanges of resources. The study of these problems in various
settings is now a popular topic concerning both computer scientists and economists, in the field
coined as Multiagent Resource Allocation; see [CDE+06] for a fairly recent survey.
While money is provably reducing the complexity of many such problems, in many scenarios
monetary transfer is inapplicable; canonical examples include hospital/facility location determina-
tion, peer-to-peer sharing network, and distribution of computing resources among staffs in the same
company. Mechanism design problems without monetary transfer are thus naturally motivated.
∗This work has received funding from the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) through project ICT10-002,
and from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-
2013) / ERC Grant Agreement no. 340506.
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Briefly speaking, a mechanism is a combination of a communication protocol and an algorithm,
for agents to reveal their preferences to an auctioneer, and for the auctioneer to determine a good
allocation of resources. There are different ways to interpret the meaning of “good allocation”,
including social welfare, various measures of fairness (often coined as “cake cutting”), or revenue of
the auctioneer (when monetary transfer is feasible). Independent of the interpretation, a favourable
feature of a mechanism is strategyproofness — the mechanism motivates the agents to reveal their
preferences truthfully. Strategyproof (SP) mechanism design without monetary transfer has been
studied under various contexts, e.g.,[SV02, PT09, DFMN12, DG10].
We focus on the problem formulated by Guo and Conitzer [GC10]: design SP mechanisms for
allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear preferences over the items. The target
is to attain social welfares which are competitive against those in the first-best mechanism (which is
not SP).
In contrast to most of the prior work, we take on an analytic approach for the problem. While all
known SP mechanisms (which we will discuss next) are somewhat naturally motivated, they do not
shed any insight on how an optimal mechanism should look like. We will present results obtained
using analytic methods, which will suggest that analytical insights are necessary for seeking the
optimal mechanisms.
1.1 Related Work
Guo and Conitzer [GC10] considered a sub-class of SP mechanisms called Swap-Dictatorial mech-
anisms, in which each agent is a dictator with probability 12 , who chooses her favourite allocation
from a predefined set of allowable allocations, and the other agent is allocated the remaining items.1
They studied two sub-classes of Swap-Dictatorial mechanisms, Increasing-Price (IP) mechanisms and
Linear-Increasing-Price (LIP) mechanisms. For the case with two items, they showed that there is
a LIP mechanism which is 0.828-competitive against the first-best mechanism; they used a linear
program to show that no SP mechanism can be better than 0.841-competitive. They also showed
that as the number of items goes to infinity, IP and LIP mechanisms have maximal competitiveness
of 12 .
Han et al. [HSTZ11] showed a number of upper bound results on the competitiveness of SP
mechanisms, when the numbers of agents and/or items increase. In particular, they showed that no
swap-dictatorial mechanism can be better than
(
1
2 + om(1)
)
-competitive for m items. In addition,
they proved the following characterization result: in the case with two items, if a mechanism A
is symmetric and second order continuously differentiable, then A is SP if and only if A is swap-
dictatorial.
Cole, Gkatzelis and Goel [CGG13a] proposed another sub-class of SP mechanisms (for any number
of agents) called Partial Allocation (PA) mechanisms, which are not swap-dictatorial. They showed
in another work [CGG13b] that a variant of PA mechanism is 23 -competitive for two agents and any
number of items.
Recently, non-SP resource allocation mechanisms are also under study. The mechanisms are
considered as games and the bids of agents are strategies. The canonical measure of efficiency is the
Price of Anarchy. See [FLZ09, BCD+14] and the references therein for more details.
We note that in every swap-dictatorial mechanism, all items are always completely allocated
among the agents — the auctioneer never holds some of the items from being allocated. However,
this is not true in PA mechanism. We say a mechanism is full if all items are always completely
allocated among the agents, and say it is partial otherwise.
1Swap-Dictatorial mechanisms can be generalized to more than two agents, by first generating a random order of
the agents, and then each agent takes turn to choose her favourite allocation.
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1.2 Our Contribution
Our main contribution is to use analytic methods to derive SP mechanisms with competitiveness
better than those previously known. We also improve a linear-program (LP) based proof to show
new upper bounds on the competitive ratios for SP full and partial mechanisms. In addition, we
provide the first compact upper bound proof.
In Sections 3—6, we focus on the case with two agents and two items. In Section 3, we first
prove a characterization of symmetric SP mechanisms, which is essentially the same as the Rochet’s
characterization [Roc85]. Then we provide a set of sufficient conditions for symmetric SP mechanisms.
We note that while our set of sufficient conditions and the characterization in [HSTZ11] are both
of analytical flavor, the two results are not comparable: their result focuses on conditions that
yield equivalence between SP mechanisms and swap-dictatorial mechanisms (which must be full
mechanisms), while our result is applicable for a broad sub-class of partial mechanisms, and also
mechanisms which are not second order continuously differentiable.
In Section 4, we look into the solution to a LP of Guo and Contizer [GC10] for making a few
observations and heuristic assumptions, which allow us to derive a 56 -competitive full mechanism; we
believe it is an optimal full mechanism.2 In Section 5, by using our set of sufficient conditions, we
consider a sub-family of SP partial mechanisms, and show that one of such mechanisms is strictly
better than 56 -competitive. This may be surprising to some practitioners, since it suggests that in
general, the competitiveness can be improved by suitably holding a fraction of items from being
allocated.
Guo and Conitzer used the LP to show an upper bound of 0.841 on the competitiveness of SP
full mechanisms. We will discuss how to prune out a lot of unnecessary constraints from their LP.
This allows us to solve the LP with much refined resolution, and to improve the upper bound to
5
6 + ǫ, where ǫ < 10
−9; we believe the final answer is 56 . With a minor modification to their LP, we
show an upper bound of 0.8644 on the competitiveness of SP partial mechanisms.
While the LP-based upper bound proofs are legitimate, they may look unsatisfactory to some
researchers, due to two reasons. First, such proofs are hardly verifiable by researchers without the use
of a computer. Second, such LPs are extremely huge for three or more items and thus not solvable
in practice, so they shed no insight for providing a better upper bound when the number of items
increases. Therefore, a compact upper bound proof, i.e., a proof which can be easily verifiable by
researchers, is preferred. In Section 6, we use the SP characterization of Rochet [Roc85] to provide
the first compact proof; the upper bound is 0.9523. While this upper bound is worse than those
yielded by LP-based proofs, the compact proof is worth an attention since it might shed insight for
generalizations.
In Section 7, we consider the cases with two agents and any number of items. By taking a suitable
average of some PA mechanisms of Cole et al. [CGG13a, CGG13b], we design a SP mechanism which
is at least 0.67776-competitive.
In Section 8, we propose a new sub-class of SP mechanisms for any number of agents and items,
called Dynamic-Increasing-Price (DIP) mechanisms. DIP mechanism is similar to IP mechanism
in the sense that both introduce virtual money and virtual prices. However, there is no dictator-
swapping process in DIP, and DIP is not swap-dictatorial in general. Also, the prices in an IP
mechanism is independent of agents’ preferences, but in a DIP mechanism, for each agent, the prices
of the items depend on other agents’ preferences. In other words, a DIP mechanism enforces all
agents to be complete price takers. We note that DIP is well motivated by the classical context of
markets: when the scale of the market is large, each agent in the market has tiny effect on the prices,
so the prices she face are almost completely depending on other agents preferences. We show that
2There may be more than one optimal full mechanisms.
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the 56 -competitive mechanism is a DIP mechanism.
2 Preliminaries
Problem Setting. We study the problem of allocating m ≥ 2 divisible items, each of one unit,
among two agents, referred to as agents 1 and 2. A vector (c1, · · · , cm) is normalized if each cj ≥ 0
and
∑m
j=1 cj = 1. Each agent i has a normalized
3 linear utility function ui(~xi) =
∑m
j=1 uijxij, where∑m
j=1 uij = 1; her utility function is identified to the normalized utility vector ~ui := (ui1, · · · , uim).
Each agent i reports to mechanism A a normalized bid vector ~bi = (bi1, · · · , bim). The mechanism
A, based on the bids, allocates Aij(~b1,~b2) unit of item j to agent i. The allocation must be feasible,
i.e., for any i, j, Aij(~b1,~b2) ≥ 0 and for any j, A1j(~b1,~b2) +A2j(~b1,~b2) ≤ 1.
Let
uAi (
~b1,~b2) :=
m∑
j=1
uij ·Aij(~b1,~b2),
which is the utility attained by agent i when agent 1 bids ~b1 and agent 2 bids ~b2. Mechanism A is
strategyproof (SP) if for any agent i and for any normalized vectors ~bi,~b3−i,
uAi (~ui,
~b3−i) ≥ u
A
i (
~bi,~b3−i),
i.e., agent i is always better off to bid her true utility vector. Strategyproofness is generally accepted
as a favourable feature of a mechanism, since it discourages agents from having strategic consideration
for reporting bids.
Let
SW
A(~u1, ~u2) := u
A
1 (~u1, ~u2) + u
A
2 (~u1, ~u2),
which is the social welfare when both agents bid truthfully to mechanism A. Let
SWOPT(~u1, ~u2) :=
m∑
j=1
max{u1j , u2j},
which is the maximum possible social welfare among all feasible allocations; the feasible allocation
that attains the maximum possible social welfare is called the first-best allocation. A SP mechanism
A is α-competitive if for any ~u1, ~u2, SW
A(~u1, ~u2) ≥ α · SWOPT(~u1, ~u2). Our target is to design SP
mechanisms with high competitive ratios.
Useful Definitions, Facts and Tool. It is known that every α-competitive SP mechanism has a
corresponding symmetric-over-agents and symmetric-over-items α-competitive SP mechanism [GC10,
Claim 1]. Thus, from now on we focus only on such symmetric SP mechanisms.
When the agents’ utility functions are linear, any weighted average over SP mechanisms is also
SP: if A1, · · · , Ak are SP mechanisms, then A¯, defined by the allocation rule
A¯ij(~b1,~b2) :=
k∑
ℓ=1
βℓ · A
ℓ
ij(
~b1,~b2),
where the βℓ’s are positive and
∑k
ℓ=1 βℓ = 1, is also SP. We will write A¯ as
∑k
ℓ=1 βℓ ·A
ℓ.
For any utility functions of the agents u1, u2, let their attainable utility region (AUR) be
AUR(u1, u2) := {(r1, r2) | ∃ a feasible allocation (~x1, ~x2) s.t. u1(~x1) = r1 and u2(~x2) = r2 } .
3See [GC10, Section 2] for an explanation on why the utility functions are normalized.
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Proposition 1. If u1, u2 are increasing, concave and continuous functions, then AUR(u1, u2) is a
convex subset of R2.
Proof. Suppose (r1, r2), (r
′
1, r
′
2) ∈ AUR(u1, u2) and β is any real number in [0, 1]. It suffices to prove
that (βr1 + (1− β)r
′
1, βr2 + (1− β)r
′
2) ∈ AUR(u1, u2).
Let (~x1, ~x2) be a feasible allocation such that for i = 1, 2, ui(~xi) = ri. Let (~x
′
1, ~x
′
2) be a feasible
allocation such that for i = 1, 2, ui(~x
′
i) = r
′
i. Note that (β · ~x1 + (1 − β) · ~x
′
1, β · ~x2 + (1 − β) · ~x
′
2) is
also a feasible allocation. Since ui is a concave function,
ui(β · ~xi + (1− β) · ~x
′
i) ≥ β · ui(~xi) + (1− β) · ui(~x
′
i) = βri + (1− β)r
′
i.
Then, since ui is increasing and continuous, there exists γi ∈ [0, 1] such that
ui(βγi · ~xi + (1− β)γi · ~x
′
i) = βri + (1− β)r
′
i,
i.e., (βγ1 · ~x1+ (1− β)γ1 · ~x
′
1, βγ2 · ~x2+ (1− β)γ2 · ~x
′
2) is a feasible allocation that verifies (βr1+ (1−
β)r′1, βr2 + (1− β)r
′
2) ∈ AUR(u1, u2).
3 A Set of Sufficient Conditions for Strategyproofness
In Sections 3—6, we focus on the case with two items. In this case, each normalized utility vector has
the form (t, 1− t), which is essentially single-parameter. We assume that each agent i bids a number
bi ∈ [0, 1], which is supposed to be the first entry of her normalized utility vector. A symmetric
mechanism A can be described by a single function A : [0, 1]2 → R+, such that
A11(b1, b2) ≡ A(b1, b2) A12(b1, b2) ≡ A(1− b1, 1− b2)
A21(b1, b2) ≡ A(b2, b1) A22(b1, b2) ≡ A(1− b2, 1− b1)
In this section, we first prove a characterization of SP symmetric mechanisms (Theorem 2), which
follows almost directly from a characterization result of Rochet [Roc85, Theorem 1]; we will provide
a self-contained proof. Then we use the characterization to provide a set of sufficient conditions for
strategyproofness (Theorem 3), which will be used in the next three sections.
Let
uˆA(b1, b2) := b1 ·A(b1, b2) + (1 − b1) · A(1− b1, 1− b2),
which is the utility attained by agent 1 if her true utility vector is (b1, 1 − b1), she bids truthfully,
and agent 2 bids b2.
Theorem 2 ([Roc85, Theorem 1]). Let A be a symmetric mechanism for two items. A is SP if and
only if
(a) for any fixed b2 ∈ [0, 1], uˆ
A(b1, b2) is a convex function of b1, and
(b) for any fixed b2 ∈ [0, 1], z := A(t1, b2) − A(1 − t1, 1 − b2) is a sub-gradient of uˆ
A(b1, b2) at
b1 = t1, i.e., for any b1 ∈ [0, 1],
uˆA(b1, b2) ≥ uˆ
A(t1, b2) + z · (b1 − t1).
We note that since we are considering symmetric mechanisms, in the above theorem, stating the
conditions (a) and (b) w.r.t. agent 1 only is without loss of generality.
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Proof. If A is SP, then uˆA(b1, b2) = supb′1 b1 ·A(b
′
1, b2)+(1−b1) ·A(1−b
′
1, 1−b2), which is a supremum
of linear functions of b1, thus uˆ
A(b1, b2) is convex w.r.t. b1, i.e., condition (a) holds.
Next, we show that condition (b) is equivalent to strategyproofness as below; the second, third
and the fourth statements below are equivalent since the R.H.S. of the inequalities in them are indeed
identical.
A is SP
⇔ ∀b1, b2, t1, uˆ
A(b1, b2) ≥ b1 ·A(t1, b2) + (1− b1) · A(1− t1, 1− b2)
⇔ ∀b1, b2, t1, uˆ
A(b1, b2) ≥ t1 · A(t1, b2) + (1− t1) ·A(1− t1, 1− b2) + z · (b1 − t1)
⇔ ∀b1, b2, t1, uˆ
A(b1, b2) ≥ uˆ
A(t1, b2) + z · (b1 − t1)
⇔ condition (b) holds.
Theorem 3. Let A be a symmetric mechanism, described by function A(b1, b2). If for any fixed b2,
A(b1, b2) is increasing, continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable w.r.t. b1, and if for any
t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1], the equality
4
t1 ·
∂A
∂b1
(t1, t2) = (1− t1) ·
∂A
∂b1
(1− t1, 1 − t2) (1)
holds within each piecewise interval, then A is SP.
Proof. Recall that
uˆA(b1, b2) = b1 · A(b1, b2) + (1− b1) · A(1− b1, 1− b2).
By the assumptions on A, ∂uˆ
A
∂b1
(t1, t2) exists everywhere (except perhaps at the endpoints of the
piecewise intervals), and its value is
A(t1, t2) − A(1 − t1, 1− t2) + t1 ·
∂A
∂b1
(t1, t2) − (1− t1) ·
∂A
∂b1
(1− t1, 1− t2).
The final two terms cancel out due to (1). Hence,
∂uˆA
∂b1
(t1, t2) = A(t1, t2) − A(1− t1, 1− t2). (2)
Since A is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable w.r.t. its first parameter, at any
endpoint (t1, t2) of a piecewise interval, the left and right partial derivatives of uˆ
A w.r.t. its first
parameter are equal, i.e., ∂uˆ
A
∂b1
(t1, t2) exists at the endpoint too.
When t1 increases, A(t1, t2) increases but A(1− t1, 1− t2) decreases. By (2),
∂uˆA
∂b1
(t1, t2) increases
with t1 within each piecewise interval. Thus, uˆ
A(b1, b2) is convex w.r.t. b1, i.e., condition (a) in
Theorem 2 holds.
(2) and condition (a) imply that A(t1, t2) − A(1 − t1, 1 − t2) is a subgradient of uˆ
A(b1, t2) at
b1 = t1, i.e., condition (b) in Theorem 2 holds. Then by Theorem 2, A is SP.
Note that the allocation functions of Partial Allocation mechanisms in [CGG13a, CGG13b] are
discontinuous, so Theorem 3 is not applicable.
4A clarification on the perhaps misleading notation: at any specific point (y1, y2),
∂A
∂b1
(y1, y2) is the value of the partial
derivative of A w.r.t. its first parameter at that point. To be crystal clear, ∂A
∂b1
(y1, y2) = limδ→0
A(y1+δ,y2)−A(y1,y2)
δ
.
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4 A 56-Competitive Full Mechanism for Two Items
Guo and Conitzer [GC10] introduced the linear program (LP) below, which represents the optimal
full mechanism when the bids are restricted to be multiples of 1/N for some integer N . Let [N ]
denote the set of all multiples of 1/N which are between zero and one.
maxλ
∀t1, t
′
1, t2 ∈ [N ], uˆ
A(t1, t2) ≥ t1 ·A(t
′
1, t2) + (1− t1) ·A(1− t
′
1, 1 − t2); (stragyproofness)
∀t1, t2 ∈ [N ], SW
A(t1, t2) ≥ (1 + |t1 − t2|)λ; (competitiveness)
∀t1, t2 ∈ [N ], A(t1, t2) +A(t2, t1) = 1; (3)
∀t1, t2 ∈ [N ], A(t1, t2) ≥ 0.
They solved the LP with N = 50. The optimal λ value, which is 0.841, is an upper bound on the
optimal competitiveness of SP full mechanisms for two items.
The LP has Θ(N2) variables and Θ(N3) constraints, which is efficiently solvable only for small N .
However, one would expect that the strategyproofness constraints with large |t1−t
′
1| are unnecessary.
So we keep only those constraints with |t1 − t
′
1| = 1/N . This reduces the number of constraints to
Θ(N2), allowing us to solve the LP with a much refined resolution of N = 400. We obtain an
improved upper bound of 56 + ǫ, where ǫ < 10
−9. We believe that 56 is the final answer.
We make two observations from the solution to the LP, and make two heuristic assumptions. We
then use the observations and assumptions to derive a full mechanism which is 56 -competitive.
Observation 1. There exists a function f : [0, 1] → R such that A(t1, t2) = f(t1) − f(t2) +
1
2 .
Furthermore, f is increasing, continuous and piecewise differentiable.
Observation 2. For all t ∈
[
0, 15
]
, f(t) = 0. For all t ∈
[
4
5 , 1
]
, f(t) is a constant.
Assumption 3. The function A(t1, t2) satisfies the equality (1), except at points where t1 ∈
{1/5, 4/5}.
With Observation 1, Observation 2 and Assumption 3, (1) yields
∀t ∈ [0, 1] \ {1/5, 4/5} , tf ′(t) = (1− t)f ′(1− t). (4)
With Observation 2, the social welfare attained when t2 = 0 is 1 + t1
(
f(t1)− f(1− t1) +
1
2
)
,
while SWOPT(t1, t2) = 1+ t1. For the mechanism to be
5
6 -competitive, the following inequality must
hold: 1 + t1
(
f(t1)− f(1− t1) +
1
2
)
≥ 56 (1 + t1), or equivalently
f(t)− f(1− t) ≥
1
3
−
1
6t
. (5)
Observe that by (4), once the values of f(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 are known, the values of f(t) for
1
2 ≤ t ≤ 1
can be determined. We now state the final heuristic assumption: in (5), the equality holds for
t ∈
[
1
5 ,
1
2
]
.
Assumption 4. ∀t ∈
[
1
5 ,
1
2
]
, f(t)− f(1− t) = 13 −
1
6t .
With (5) and Assumption 4, we can solve f using calculus, which is:
f(t) =


0, t ∈
[
0, 15
]
;
5
6 −
1
6t −
1
6 ln(5t), t ∈
[
1
5 ,
1
2
]
;
1
2 −
1
6 ln(5− 5t), t ∈
[
1
2 ,
4
5
]
;
1
2 , t ∈
[
4
5 , 1
]
.
(6)
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Theorem 4. The full mechanism A as described in Assumption 1 and (6) is feasible, SP and 56-
competitive.
Proof. Feasibility trivially holds. Strategyproofness follows from Observation 1, Assumption 3 and
Theorem 3.
For competitiveness, note that
SW
A(t1, t2) = 1 + (t1 − t2) [f(t1)− f(t2)− f(1− t1) + f(1− t2)] .
Showing that A is 56 -competitive is equivalent to showing that SW
A(t1, t2) ≥
5
6(1 + |t1 − t2|), which
can be done with an appropriate case analysis (which is needed due to the piecewise definition of f)
and simple calculus; we skip the details.
5 A Partial Mechanism for Two Items – Strictly Better than 5
6
-
Competitive
By changing the equality sign in (3) to a ≤ sign, Guo and Conitzer’s LP covers partial mechanisms
also. The modified LP provides an upper bound of 0.8644. We look into its solution, as we did in
Section 4, but we do not recognize a nice pattern.
Since we solve the modified LP with high resolution, we believe that an optimal partial mechanism
attains competitive ratio close to 0.8644, which beats the 56 + ǫ upper bound for full mechanism.
Yet, to formally prove that an optimal partial mechanism is strictly better than an optimal full
mechanism, we ought to provide a concrete, and preferably compact, SP partial mechanism which is
strictly better than (56 + ǫ)-competitive. This is the purpose of the current section.
Let f1 : [0, 1/2] → R and f2 : [1/2, 1] → R be two increasing and continuously differentiable
functions such that for all t ∈ [0, 1/2], tf ′1(t) = (1 − t)f
′
2(1 − t), and f1(0) = f2 (1/2) = 0. Also, let
Q,R : [0, 1]→ R+ be two functions. Then define the function
A(t1, t2) :=
{
Q(t2) · f1(t1) +R(t2), t1 ∈ [0, 1/2] ;
A
(
1
2 , t2
)
+Q(1− t2) · f2(t1), t1 ∈ (1/2, 1] .
It is easy to verify that the above function A satisfies all conditions required in Theorem 3, and thus
it yields a SP mechanism, modulo feasibility constraint.
Our strategy is to pick some choice of f1, f2, and then use an LP to find out Q,R, such that A
is feasible and attains a good competitiveness. As before, we formulate the LP with bids restricted
to be multiples of 1/N for some integer N . The LP is stated below; note that we impose a slightly
stricter feasibility constraint, in which only (1 − δ) fraction, for some δ > 0, of each item can be
allocated. The reason will be clear later.
maxλ
∀t1, t2 ∈ [N ], A(t1, t2) +A(t2, t1) ≤ 1− δ;
∀t1, t2 ∈ [N ], SW
A(t1, t2) ≥ (1 + |t1 − t2|)λ.
∀t ∈ [N ], Q(t), R(t) ≥ 0.
It is easy to verify that the above program is an LP with variables Q(t), R(t) for t ∈ [N ], plus an
extra variable λ.
Lacking further insight on how a good choice of f1, f2 should be, we try the natural candidate
f1(t) := t, and hence f2(t) := ln(2t)− t+1/2. Then we solve the above LP with resolution N = 1000
8
and δ = 2.92/2000. The optimal λ is larger than 0.835524. Let the optimal solution be Q∗, R∗. We
note that the maximum entry in Q∗ is less than 1.46.
Now, we are ready to describe the desired symmetric SP mechanism A˜. A˜ takes t1, t2 as bids
from the two agents. Let t˜1, t˜2 be the values by rounding t1, t2 to its nearest multiple of 1/N .
A˜(t1, t2) :=
{
Q∗(t˜2) · f1(t1) +R
∗(t˜2), t1 ∈ [0, 1/2] ;
A˜
(
1
2 , t˜2
)
+Q∗(1− t˜2) · f2(t1), t1 ∈ (1/2, 1] .
The rounding is needed because the domains of Q∗, R∗ are [N ]. The rounding does not destroy
strategyproofness; one can verify that A˜ is SP using Theorem 3. 5
Since the maximum entry of Q∗ is less than 1.46, and since the derivatives of f1, f2 are bounded
by 1, ∂A˜∂b1 (b1, b2) < 1.46 for all b1, b2. Also, note that |ti − t˜i| ≤ 1/2000. Due to the first constraint of
the LP above, A˜(t˜1, t˜2) + A˜(t˜2, t˜1) ≤ 1− δ. Thus,
A˜(t1, t2) + A˜(t2, t1) < A˜(t˜1, t˜2) +
1.46
2000
+ A˜(t˜2, t˜1) +
1.46
2000
≤ 1.
This verifies the feasibility of A˜.
To bound the competitiveness of A˜, first note that by Theorem 2,
uˆA˜(t1, t˜2) ≥ uˆ
A˜(t˜1, t˜2)−
1
2000
and uˆA˜(t2, t˜1) ≥ uˆ
A˜(t˜2, t˜1)−
1
2000
.
From the LP, we have
uˆA˜(t˜1, t˜2) + uˆ
A˜(t˜2, t˜1)
1 + |t˜1 − t˜2|
≥ 0.835524.
With the above two sets of inequalities, we proceed a simple error analysis to show that the compet-
itiveness of A˜ with bids t1, t2 is
uˆA˜(t1, t2) + uˆ
A˜(t2, t1)
1 + |t1 − t2|
=
uˆA˜(t1, t˜2) + uˆ
A˜(t2, t˜1)
1 + |t1 − t2|
≥ 0.833689,
which is strictly larger than 56 + ǫ.
To program mechanism A˜, we need to store the values of Q∗, R∗ at 1001 discrete values, and to
compute f1, f2 at arbitrary real values in their domain. While this may not look compact to some
people, A˜ is a concrete SP partial mechanism that breaks the 56 barrier.
6 A Compact Upper Bound Proof
In this section, we provide a compact upper bound proof on the competitiveness of SP mechanisms.
First of all, we make the following qualitative observation. Suppose ~ui = (ti, 1 − ti). For some
t1, t2, if agent 1 earns a too high utility from the mechanism, then the utility earned by agent 2 has
to be very low, forcing a low competitive ratio; conversely, if agent 1 earns too low a utility, this
forces a low competitive ratio too. Thus, to attain a high competitive ratio h, there is a restricted
range of utility values that each agent can earn. Geometrically, the utilities earned by the agents
must lie in the intersection of AUR(t1, t2) and Rh(t1, t2) := {(r1, r2) | r1 + r2 ≥ h · SWOPT(t1, t2)}.
5In general, if an allocation function for agent i, denoted by A′i(~ui, ~u−i), yields a SP mechanism, then any other
allocation function A′′i (~ui, ~u−i) ≡ A
′
i(~ui, T (~u−i)), where T is an arbitrary function with range compatible with the
domain of the second parameter of A′i, yields a SP mechanism too.
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Briefly, our proof strategy is: for some h, t1, t2, since the utilities earned by both agents are re-
stricted to certain range, the allocations are restricted too. Then due to Theorem 2, the subgradients
of uˆA at certain points are also restricted. We then show that if h is too high, the above restrictions
add up to forbid the existence of uˆA.
Let
Uh(t1, t2) := max{r1 | ∃(r1, r2) ∈ AUR(t1, t2) ∩Rh(t1, t2)}
Lh(t1, t2) := min{r1 | ∃(r1, r2) ∈ AUR(t1, t2) ∩Rh(t1, t2)}.
Theorem 5. For the case with two items, no SP mechanism is better than 0.9523-competitive.
Proof. By [GC10, Claim 1], it suffices to prove that no symmetric SP mechanism is better than
0.9523-competitive.
Suppose the contrary that there exists an h-competitive symmetric SP mechanism A, where
h = 0.9523. We compute the following functions explicitly:
Uh(t1, 0.1) =


1−
( 11
10
−t1)h−1
1
10
−t1
t1, t1 ∈
[
0, 1110 −
1
h
]
;
1, t1 ∈
[
11
10 −
1
h ,
1
h −
9
10
]
;
1 +
(t1+
9
10
)h−1
t1−
1
10
(t1 − 1), t1 ∈
[
1
h −
9
10 , 1
]
.
Lh(t1, 0.1) =


( 11
10
−t1)h−1
1
10
−t1
(1− t1), t1 ∈
[
0, 1110 −
1
h
]
;
0, t1 ∈
[
11
10 −
1
h ,
1
h −
9
10
]
;
(t1+
9
10
)h−1
t1−
1
10
t1, t1 ∈
[
1
h −
9
10 , 1
]
.
Uh(t1, 0) = min
{
1, 1 +
(t1 + 1)h− 1
t1
(t1 − 1)
}
.
In particular, we have
0.4753 = Lh(0, 0.1) ≤ uˆ
A(0, 0.1) ≤ Uh(0, 0.1) = 1.
Let q := uˆA(0, 0.1). Then A(1, 0.9) = q. By feasibility, A(0, 0.1) ≥ 0. Thus, A(0, 0.1)−A(1, 0.9) ≥
−q. By Theorem 2, for any t1 ∈ [0, 1],
uˆA(t1, 0.1) ≥ q − qt1. (7)
Since A is h-competitive, uˆA(0.1, 0) ≥ 1110h − q. Since A(1, 0.9) = q, A(0.9, 1) ≤ 1 − q. Then we
have
A(0.1, 0) =
uˆA(0.1, 0) − 0.9 ·A(0.9, 1)
0.1
≥ 11h − 9− q,
and hence A(0.1, 0) −A(0.9, 1) ≥ 11h − 10. By Theorem 2, for any t1 ∈ [0.1, 1],
uˆA(t1, 0) ≥
11
10
h− q + (11h − 10)(t1 − 0.1). (8)
Next, we show that for any possible value of q, there exists t1 such that either condition (7) or
condition (8) is violated. Observe that when q increases, the lower bound in (7) increases, while the
lower bound in (8) decreases. Thus, once we find a q∗ such that
(a) ∃t′1 ∈ [0, 1] with q
∗ − q∗t′1 > Uh(t
′
1, 0.1), and
(b) ∃t′′1 ∈ [0.1, 1] with
11
10h− q
∗ + (11h − 10)(t′′1 − 0.1) > Uh(t
′′
1, 0),
then for any q ≥ q∗, by (7) and (a), uˆA(t′1, 0.1) > Uh(t
′
1, 0.1), a contradiction; for any q < q
∗, by (8)
and (b), uˆA(t′′1, 0) > Uh(t
′′
1, 0), again a contradiction.
We find that q∗ = 0.6979 satisfies (a) and (b), with t′1 = 0.26 and t
′′
1 = 0.32.
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7 A 0.67776-Competitive Mechanism for Multiple Items
Cole et al. [CGG13a] introduced a family of SP mechanisms called Partial Allocation (PA) mecha-
nisms, which work for multiple agents and multiple items. We describe the two-agent version PAc
below.6 In [CGG13b], they showed that a variant of a PA mechanism, which we denote by PAmax, is
SP and it is 23 -competitive for two agents and multiple items. We will show that by taking a suitable
weighted average of two PA mechanisms and PAmax, we break the
2
3 barrier.
PAc(~u1, ~u2) for 0 < c <∞: PAmax(~u1, ~u2):
1. Compute the feasible allocation (~a1,~a2) 1. Compute the allocation of PA1(~u1, ~u2).
that maximizes u1(~a1) · u2(~a2)
c. 2. Compute the allocation in which each
Let W (u1, u2) denote the maximal value. item is split evenly among the two agents.
2. Agent 1 is allocated a u2(~a2)
c fraction of ~a1; 3. Output the allocation that yields higher
agent 2 is allocated a u1(~a1)
1/c fraction of ~a2. social welfare.
(See footnote 6).
To build up an intuition on why this might work, we look at an almost worst case scenario for
PAmax, where there are two items, ~u1 = (0.99, 0.01) and ~u2 = (0.5, 0.5). In PA1, ~a1 = (1, 0) and
~a2 = (0, 1), u1(~a1) = 0.99 and u2(~a2) = 0.5. The eventual allocation to agent 1 is
1
2~a1, i.e., reducing
~a1 by half. This reduction harms the eventual social welfare hugely.
If we consider PAc for some c less than 1, say c = 0.5, the eventual allocation to agent 1 is much
better, which is 0.50.5~a1 ≈ 0.707a1. The eventual allocation to agent 2 in PA0.5 is 0.99
2~a2, which is
slightly worse than 0.99~a2, the eventual allocation to agent 2 in PA1. But overall, the social welfare
in PA0.5 is much better.
However, there are bad scenarios for PA0.5, e.g., when the utility functions of the two agents
in the last paragraph are swapped. To attain an overall good competitiveness, we consider some
weighted average of
(
1
2 ·PAc +
1
2 ·PA1/c
)
and PAmax. For each choice of c and the weights, by
using the tool of AUR, we can compute the competitive ratio with math software. We find that for
a suitable choice of c and the weights, a competitive ratio of 0.67776 is attained.
Theorem 6. The mechanism(
1029
4000
·PA0.421 +
1029
4000
·PA1/0.421 +
971
2000
·PAmax
)
is SP, and it is at least 0.67776-competitive.
Proof. The mechanism is SP since it is a weighted average of three SP mechanisms.
For any u1, u2, let (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ∈ AUR(u1, u2) be a point that attains the optimal social welfare
SWOPT(~u1, ~u2). Observe that (1, 0), (0, 1) ∈ AUR(u1, u2). Thus by Proposition 1, AUR(u1, u2) con-
tains the line segment ℓ1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) that joins (1, 0) and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), and also the line segment ℓ2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2)
that joins (0, 1) and (u∗1, u
∗
2). Let ℓ(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) := ℓ1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ∪ ℓ2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2).
Recall the notionW (u1, u2) defined in PAc. Note that SW
PAc(u1, u2) = W (u1, u2)+W (u1, u2)
1/c,
and
W (u1, u2) ≥ max
(r1,r2)∈ℓ(u∗1 ,u
∗
2)
r1 · (r2)
c.
These allow us to turn to the easier single-variate optimization problems along the two line segments.
For our choices of c and the weights, we run through all possible values of (u∗1, u
∗
2), which is the
set {(u∗1, u
∗
2) | 0 ≤ u
∗
1, u
∗
2 ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ u
∗
1 + u
∗
2 ≤ 2}, to compute the competitive ratio. We perform
6Since the utility functions are normalized, 0 < u2(~a2)
c, u1(~a1)
1/c
≤ 1. So Step 2 of PAc is legitimate.
Also, we note that the eventual utility attained by agent 1 is u1(~a1) · u2(~a2)
c = W (u1, u2), and the eventual utility
attained by agent 2 is u1(~a1)
1/c
· u2(~a2) = W (u1, u2)
1/c.
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this with math software, but first only considering discrete points where u∗1, u
∗
2 are multiples of
1
2000 .
The competitive ratio over these discrete points is at least 0.67844.
For general (u∗1, u
∗
2), we first round them down to the nearest multiple of
1
2000 to (u˜
∗
1, u˜
∗
2). Observe
that
max
(r1,r2)∈ℓ(u∗1 ,u
∗
2)
r1 · (r2)
c ≥ max
(r1,r2)∈ℓ(u˜∗1,u˜
∗
2)
r1 · (r2)
c,
and 1 ≤ u∗1 + u
∗
2 ≤ u˜
∗
1 + u˜
∗
2 +
1
1000 . Thus, the competitive ratio over general points is at least
0.67844 ×
(
1− 11000
)
> 0.67776.
8 Dynamic-Increasing-Price Mechanisms
In this section, we propose a sub-class of SP mechanisms for any number of agents and items. For
simplicity, we describe the general form of DIP mechanisms for the case with two agents. It is easy
to see how to generalize to the cases with any number of agents.
Recall that the number of items is m. For each agent i, she has one unit of virtual money.
For each item j, agent i will be given a price function P
u3−i
j : [0, 1] → R
+ ∪ {0,+∞}, which is an
increasing function that depends on the utility function of the agent 3 − i. We will write P−ij as
a shorthand for P
u3−i
j . The value P
−i
j (y) describes the marginal price when agent i has already
purchased y units of item j. In other words, if agent i purchases xj units of item j, she needs
to pay T−ij (xj) :=
∫ xj
0 P
−i
j (y) dy unit of her virtual money. Agent i will purchase an allocation
~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xm) which is in
argmax
∀j, 0≤xj≤1∑m
j=1 T
−i
j (xj)≤1
m∑
j=1
uijxj.
A DIP mechanism is obviously SP, since each agent is accepting prices which she herself cannot
influence, and uses them to decide an optimal purchase. Yet, feasibility is a delicate issue, particularly
when m is large.
While there are some similarities between DIP and IP mechanisms, we note that there is no
process of dictator-swapping in DIP, and DIP is not swap-dictatorial and not full in general. Another
difference between DIP and IP is that in DIP the price functions are price versus quantity of item
already purchased, while in IP they are price versus virtual money already spent.
DIP is well motivated, as explained below. In the first-best allocation, if u1j > u2j , then agent 1
gets all of item j. When u1j is high but u2j is low, ideally we want to construct the price function
P−1j , P
−2
j such that P
−2
j is lower to encourage agent 1 to purchase more item j, but P
−1
j is higher to
discourage agent 2 from purchasing more item j. Adjusting the prices dynamically in this manner
might help pushing the allocation in DIP towards the first best allocation, and therefore might be
hopeful to attain better competitiveness.
The way that DIP works is similar to price taking in the context of Fisher market: suppose
an agent enters a Fisher market where items are sold, the prices she takes surely depend on other
agents’ preferences, while she herself can also have influence on the prices — as a mechanism, DIP
deliberately removes such influence by herself. In a non-rigorous sense, we may say that DIP is a
rescue for Fisher markets from being non-strategyproof.
We note that Cole et al. [CGG13b, Theorem 1] proved that when there are two agents and
multiple items, Fisher market equilibrium allocation (which is also the proportional fair allocation)
is highly competitive against the first-best allocation.
As a simple example, the SP mechanism that allocates half of each item to both agents is DIP,
by setting P−ij (y) = 0 for y ∈
[
0, 12
]
and P−ij (y) = +∞ for y ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
.
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Proposition 7. The 56-competitive mechanism given in Section 4 is a DIP mechanism.
We give the price functions for agent 1 on item 1 below; other price functions are defined sym-
metrically. Recall that ~u2 = (t2, 1 − t2), and also the definition of f in (6). Let τ =
1
2 − f(t2).
Then
P−11 (y) :=


0, y ∈ [0, τ ]
C, y ∈
(
τ, f(12 ) + τ
]
C
g(y) − C, y ∈
(
f(12) + τ,
1
2 + τ
]
+∞, y ∈
(
1
2 + τ, 1
]
,
where g(y) denotes the unique value of z ∈
[
1
5 ,
1
2
]
such that f(1− z) − f(t2) +
1
2 = y, and C is the
positive constant such that
∫ 1−f(t2)
0 P
−1
1 (y) dy = 1.
9 Discussion and Open Problems
The most important problem for future research is to seek optimal competitive mechanisms. As we
have already seen, even for the case with two items, where the setting is essentially single-parameter,
the use of analytical tools seems unavoidable — for instance, it looks unlikely to have a natural
interpretation of the 56 -competitive mechanism, which we believe to be an optimal full mechanism.
In the study of revenue-optimal mechanisms with prior, more advanced analytical tools, including
duality theory and variational calculus, have played key roles. See, e.g., [PP11, GK14, GK15]. We
believe that such tools will be useful for our problem too; for instance, duality theory is likely to be
useful for showing that the upper bound for full mechanism is exactly 56 .
In Section 6, we use Rochet’s characterization to prove a non-trivial upper bound. The proof
only considers the restrictions to two cross sections of uˆA, so clearly it has not yet fully exploited the
power of the characterization. An interesting research agenda is to seek a more sophisticated use of
the characterization for proving better upper bounds, for either the case with two items, or for those
with more items.
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